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The discipline of International Relations (IR) for a long time of its history has developed in
the form of Great Debates that involved competing paradigms and schools. More recently, it
has been described as a cacophony of voices unable to communicate among themselves, but
also incapable to provide keys to understand an ever more complex reality. This collection
aims at evaluating the heuristic value of a selection of traditional paradigms (realism and
liberalism), schools (constructivism), and subdisciplines (security studies and international
political economy) so as to assess the challenges before IR theory today and the ability of the
discipline to provide tools to make the changed world still intelligible.
Keywords: Realism; liberalism; constructivism; security studies; international political
economy
Introduction
The discipline of International Relations (IR) has been put under severe strain owing
to its failure to foresee the end of the Cold War, explain it, and describe the world
afterward. Since the shock of the early 1990s, IR has been able to regain ground,
overcome some years of inner-looking epistemological debate (mainly occurring in
the 1990s with the so-called rationalist–reﬂectivist debate and the postmodern and
constructivist turns), and relaunch some of its traditional paradigms (realism and
liberalism in particular), as well as develop branches of literature on speciﬁc
domains (security and international political economy being probably the most
signiﬁcant ones) so as to integrate ontological and epistemological innovations.
However, the debate on the ‘end of IR’ is not over and has seen the involvement of
eminent scholars in the discipline (Dunne et al., 2013). IR is frequently presented as
a cacophony, an intellectual framework in which there are no more juxtaposed
paradigms (as in the well-known traditional Great Debates) and where middle-
range theories appear more promising than Grand Theory. Moreover, traditional
schools of thought have been exposed to challenges of both an ontological and
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epistemological nature not only by other theories, but also by the very subjects of
their observation.
The pieces contained here precisely emphasize on these challenges. The
contributors, in a sort of roundtable, assess the heuristic strengths and weaknesses
of theoretical traditions and main branches of literature (if not subdisciplines). The
main objective, therefore, is to assess the main challenges posed to IR theory by
theoretical or socio-political developments, and not to provide an exhaustive
overview of IR schools of thought. In addition, owing to space constraints, the
debate is focused on a limited range of traditions (realism, liberalism), approaches
(constructivism), and subdisciplines (security studies and international political
economy).
Realism is dead, long live realism?
Author: Francesco N. Moro
Realism, which for a long time was the mainstream approach in IR, and its progeny
have come under ﬁre since the end of the Cold War (Lebow, 1994). Attacks came
initially as critiques of realism’s inability to predict that watershed, and then for its
relative lack of tools to understand the ‘newworld order’. Realism also seemed to be
unable to provide appropriate tools to grasp a world characterized by the primacy
of the economy over (power) politics as the key factor in explaining both foreign
policies and international outcomes, the emergence of non-state actors, an unpre-
cedented extent of international cooperation, and interventions of the international
‘community’. State sovereignty, power, and national interests (security to begin
with) as key drivers of action often seemed relics of the past.
Nonetheless, the past 20 years have also been a period of great renewal in realism.
At least two major ‘revisions’, neorealism and neoclassical realism, occurred, giving
new life to realist thinking. The emergence of China as a great power also seems to
create new incentives for realism’s recovery at the center stage of IR. However, a few
important challenges – epistemological as well as ontological – persist: realist
scholars should address them if they want their paradigm to regain and maintain its
mainstream status in IR.
A near death?
Realism could have perhaps withstood its own failure in predicting the end of the
Cold War and the rhetoric of the ‘world’s policeman’ used by George Bush in the
1991 Gulf War, but the age of humanitarian intervention, from Somalia to Kosovo,
seemed to prove too much of a burden. Realism was challenged on its preferred ﬁeld
and military issues, and realist scholars were at odds with the activist American
approach to domestic conﬂicts, often dissenting with the positioning of the Clinton
Administration in the Balkans. Realism seemed often unable to explain major
foreign and defense policy decisions of the period, such as the expansion of NATO,
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the Iraq War of 2003, and the transformation of armed forces and military
doctrines in Western countries (Monten, 2005; Coticchia and Moro, 2014).
The debate on globalization has also contributed to a shift in attention from how
states interact (the ﬁghting ground of realism) to how state boundaries were actually
beginning to blur because of the eroding power of the economic forces that were
making the world ‘ﬂat’. Academics and inﬂuential columnists joined forces
in declaring the obsolescence of major wars (Mueller, 1989; Friedman, 2005).
Paradigms that recognized pluralism in IR were better able to grasp the impact of
economic interdependence among major powers and the signiﬁcant role of vast
transnational interests of big private companies in securing a ‘capitalist peace’
(Schneider and Gleditsch, 2010).
More broadly, non-state actors traditionally are not subject of much scrutiny by
realism. The emergence of al-Qaeda and relevance of insurgent groups in intra-state
conﬂicts created incentives for security studies to move from the analysis of conven-
tional and nuclear issues (that ﬁtted realism very well) to the onset and dynamics of
violence in civil wars. If realist scholars made important contributions (Posen, 1993),
the literature in the rest of the ﬁeld burgeoned and assumed its own features, very
different from those of the traditional IR debate. In addition, debates on ‘identity’ left
realism off-balance. Books that sparked debates, such as The Clash of Civilizations
focused on a worldwhere states were less important and religious identity was a prime
driver of action and the best explanation of cooperation and conﬂict in global politics.
Realism lives. Is China its savior?
Nonetheless, realism showed a persistent vitality. Realist scholars were involved in
public debate and were critical of several aspects of US policies, particularly in
advocating abstention from the intervention in Iraq (Art et al., 2002). Often, realism
was able to play a role in challenging conventional wisdom, unveiling the risks and
unintended consequences of action, and deﬂating the rhetorical exaggerations of
policy makers and pundits. It also continued to shape academic debate and was
responsible with reﬁned views on key topics in IR, such as alliances and the origins
of major wars (Copeland, 2000; Cesa, 2010).
In the new century, at least two attempts to renew realism deserve speciﬁc
attention. The ﬁrst is John Mearsheimer’s (2001) forceful revision of the neorealist
paradigm, culminating with the publication of The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. According to Mearsheimer, great powers not only aim to maximize their
own security by adopting mostly defensive postures but also attempt to concentrate
as much power as possible in order to try to prevent the emergence of global and
regional challengers. Only the reach of hegemony would then guarantee great
powers. Insurmountable collective action problems and mistrust hinder coopera-
tion (and alliances as well) and shape the world of ‘offensive neorealism’, with war
always in the background as a tool to solve controversies on who the hegemon is
and how it shapes its regional arena and its global positioning.
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Further, the theory of neoclassical realism emerged; ﬁrst, as a result of the hetero-
geneous work of a group of scholars and then as a more coherent attempt to provide
a revised realist approach (Lobell et al., 2009). Neoclassical realist scholars inves-
tigate more thoroughly the way in which national interests are deﬁned and foreign
policy decisions take place by focusing on domestic sources and processes. States, in
other words, can differ greatly in terms of their preferences and strategies according
to different conﬁgurations of domestic politics. Neoclassical theories then aim to
offer insights on foreign policy formation – relegated to second-order analysis in
Waltzian Neorealism – showing when and how different strategies (such as internal
vs. external balancing or bandwagoning vs. balancing) can emerge (Schweller,
2009).
Realism’s return to centrality in the debate was also owing to ongoing develop-
ments in international politics. The ﬁrst mention is China’s emergence as a potential
challenger to US primacy, initially at least in the Paciﬁc region. Irrespective of the
outcome, this is a classic issue for realist analysis, as it involves considerations
related to regional security, the determinants of military strategy, and the dynamics
of ascent and decline of powers. The second mention is the ‘fatigue’ accompanying
US participation in military adventures, particularly in complex wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These developments led policy makers – particularly in the United
States – to adopt a more prudent stance on military interventions that risk involving
‘boots on the ground’ with no vital interests at stake. The terrorist threat is still
perceived as an enduring one, but American strategy is also refocusing on conven-
tional (Russia’s regional ambitions) or nuclear-related (Iran’s and North Korea’s
nuclear programs) issues that ﬁt into the realist horizon more easily than prolonged
military campaigns for the stabilization of countries.
Current challenges to realism
Notwithstanding these vital signs, realism still faces relevant challenges. The ﬁrst
challenge is epistemological: can realism withstand the challenge of increasingly
fragmented knowledge in the social sciences and maintain unity? Several scholars
have pointed out the indeterminacy of realism: this is both a problem for this
paradigm as a guide toward formulating foreign policy and for making it ‘often
possible for realism to avoid falsiﬁcation by coming up with a variety of explana-
tions none of which is more apt to ﬁt the evidence than another’ (Vasquez, 1999:
380). Guzzini (2004) argues that realism has to come to terms with irreconcilable
changes in the practice of diplomacy that make its timeless assumptions on how the
work of international politics is actually outdated. Nonetheless, it pretends that no
justiﬁcation for these assumptions (centering on realpolitik) is needed, thus,
avoiding the thorough confrontations that are typical of scientiﬁc debates.
More broadly, the fragmentation of knowledge has deeply affected realism, and
one might wonder howmuch is left of old realism; for instance, once the assumption
of states being unitary actors is relaxed by scholars. In addition, some of the most
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interesting attempts to offer a realist view of the process of European integration
have accepted that such a phenomenon is outside the (traditional) realist perspec-
tive. For instance, Grieco’s (1995) take on European monetary integration provides
useful insights on power dynamics in international integration, but nonetheless
recognizes that very deep integration has actually taken place. Although this
pertains to most, if not all, schools or paradigms in IR, it is not a challenge to be
underestimated. To a large extent, instead of one concept of realism, there are
several realisms.
Other tenets of realism have been challenged as well. The rational choice para-
digm that often (though only in certain aspects) characterized this tradition of
thought has increasingly been coming under ﬁre in recent decades. For instance,
sociological neo-institutionalism has deeply shaped recent debates in Political
Science and IR. Organizational interests and organizational myopias have been
recognized to play an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy deci-
sions, such as the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, and notably complicate
the calculations in the offensive/defensive balance, a trademark of realist strategic
analysis. Moreover, cultural approaches have been gaining ground: concepts such
as that of ‘security culture’ are not necessarily antithetic to realist views (Johnston,
1998) but require realism to further expand its reach outside its traditional borders.
Finally, modernization processes pose possibly the most enduring empirical
challenges. According to Gat, the technological–industrial revolution ‘[…] made all
the countries that experienced the revolution […] far less belligerent in comparison
with pre-industrial times, with the interdemocratic peace representing only the most
striking manifestation of that development’ (Gat, 2005: 73). Coming to terms with
the decline or absence of major wars, linked to the emergence of more open societies
populated by (much) wealthier citizens than ever before, is the main challenge that
realist scholars have to face to avoid being relegated to being doomsayers in the
academic and policy debate.
Liberalism under challenge
Author: Sonia Lucarelli
A long paradigm of Kantian inspiration, the liberal tradition is broad and complex
and internally probably even more variegated than the realist one. Yet, within it we
can trace elements of continuity that identify it as a coherent line of thought. Among
these, let us remember the concept of international politics as consisting of a
plurality of actors; the profound trust in the institutions – above all of democracy
and institutional multilateralism – and in international economic relations as tools
of peaceful interaction; the trust in the Enlightenment concept of progress; and its
intrinsically normative, as well as explicative and descriptive posture.
Today, we can ask ourselves if this vision of international politics, with roots
reaching far back into 18th-century Enlightenment thought, is still useful to
understand contemporary international politics. The end of the ColdWar seemed to
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have decreed the victory of the liberal paradigm over its antagonists. The ratiﬁca-
tion of the Helsinki Agreement, with its attention to human rights, had played a
fundamental role in the end of bipolarism, and the forms of the expansion of
democracy and the free market were the tools used to stabilize the former Soviet
bloc; however, trust in a more democratic and peaceful world was soon to clash
with the return of ﬁerce wars (Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, etc.), the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’. Hence, what is the
heuristic capacity of the liberal paradigm today? We will focus on this question by
analyzing some of the strengths of the liberal paradigm, but most of all looking at
some of its greatest challenges.
The strength of pluralism
Probably ranking top among liberalism’s strengths in describing and understanding
contemporary international politics is its pluralism. The world is less characterized by
the sole signiﬁcant presence of states and instead by the increasing afﬁrmation of non-
state actors. The number of intergovernmental organizations has multiplied by a fac-
tor of 25 between 1977 and 2009; the inﬂuence of multinationals has been increasing
constantly since the 1970s, and the number of non-governmental organizations has
also been rising; transnational civil society has become more lively and the number of
‘global protest events’ (social fora and international civil society manifestations)
increased by almost seven times between 1990 and 2005 (Istituto per l’Enciplopedia
Italiana, 2012: 219). Megacities produce 60% of the world’s GDP (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2011) and some of them have much larger populations than the majority of
countries in the world. Liberalism, precisely because of its attention to a plurality of
actors, seems to be particularly well equipped to study an ever more plural world.
Moreover, the intrinsically normative dimension of liberalism makes it suitable
for dealing in a non-ideological manner with a topic such as that of the legitimacy of
(and responsibility in) global governance (from the ‘Responsibility to Protect’
doctrine to the debate on the legitimacy foundations of global ﬁnancial institutions,
to mention only two examples) (cf. Keohane, 2006).
The challenges
Alongside these strengths, nevertheless, liberalism has to face some undisputable
challenges.
Pluralism and security: The ﬁrst challenge concerns pluralism itself: liberalism’s
attention to non-state actors risks being highly biased (by its very conformation)
toward those actors creating greater cooperation and lowly biased toward
those non-state actors that might make international politics more conﬂict prone
(terrorist groups, failed states, private security agencies, etc.). The risk of adopting
a selectively pluralistic perspective combines a second risk that concerns the study
of security: traditionally less inclined than other traditions of thought toward
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analyzing security issues other than those regarding the institutional construction of
long-term security, liberalism risks an inability to provide instruments to understand a
reality that is ever more dense with perceived threats to security. Therefore, the chal-
lenge facing liberalism is to give a less sectorial and less presumptively cooperative
reading of international reality, whereas seeking tools to create areas of peace that can
take greater account of the complexity of the actors and security dynamics at play.
The crisis of democracy: For the liberals, ever since Kant’s treatise Perpetual Peace,
internal democracy has been a guarantee of peaceful conduct toward other democ-
racies. Yet, today, democracy is experiencing signiﬁcant transformations that may
reduce its irenic capacity. The following two transformations will be mentioned here:
the transformation of citizen participation and the illiberal drift. Decreasing citizen
participation in public life and a corresponding reduction in the legitimacy that they
attribute to institutions might have important repercussions to their ability to provide
an obstacle to war, which they are assumed to have provided in the liberal tradition
of thought. Moreover, the separation in democracy between the ‘liberal’ and the
‘procedural’ components (visible in particular in newly democratized countries) is
another concern. Even consolidated democracies, particularly since 11 September
2001, have tended to reduce individual guarantees in the name of the ﬁght of terror-
ism. This has severe implications as only if there exists a liberal ideology alongside
democratically elected institutions can there be democratic peace.
Finally, if democratic peace theory is being challenged by the transformation of
democracy at a state level, the topic of democratization is appearing ever more
emphatically at a global level. The issue is subject to intense debate; nevertheless, to
date the proposals put forward by liberal theorists are not very satisfying.
The transformation of multilateralism: Another pillar of liberal thought, multi-
lateralism, is also undergoing signiﬁcant transformations. The multilateralism
characterized by international organizations and codiﬁed regimes is leaving exten-
sive room for ad hoc agreements. Furthermore, the inefﬁciencies of traditional
multilateral institutions pose problems of legitimacy and credibility that contribute
to their difﬁculties. Finally, emerging powers are challenging the old multilateral
settings, advocating for their transformation, and new non-governmental actors are
aspiring to play an increasingly important role, sometimes undermining the tradi-
tional multilateral framework. This new global governance has had such an impact
on multilateralism that some authors have envisaged a new era of multilateralism,
labeling it ‘multilateralism 2.0’ (Van Langhenhove, 2010): a system in which non-
state actors have gained importance, there is an enhanced link between policy
domains, and there has been a diversiﬁcation of multilateral organizations. Hence,
the following question can be asked: Is multilateralism 2.0 still capable of creating
peace, as the more formal multilateralism did in the 20th century? If it is true that it
is the presence of generalized principles of conduct (stable principle beyond the
contingency) that produces peaceful effects (Ruggie, 1992), the new multilateralism
might not have irenic consequences: neither the mere coordination of a group of
‘willing states’, nor an informal multilateralism made of relations between different
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actors are based on generalized principles of conduct. The challenge put before the
liberal paradigm, therefore, is a conceptual one that combines – as is typically the
case in this tradition – with substantive problems relating to building a more
peaceful international order.
Methodology and ontology: A further challenge is a methodological one. Liber-
alism has remained largely linked to a positivistic mindset. Yet, the greatest meth-
odological challenge comes precisely from an approach, constructivism, which has
created a research program centered around concepts dear to liberalism (values,
norms) in a subjectivist ontological key, revising liberal concepts, such as that of
security communities, democratic peace, and norms diffusion (see section on con-
structivism below). Now the capacity to develop a line of research that assumes a
constructivist methodology and ontology to deal with topics dear to liberalism will
be a litmus test of the paradigm’s continuing vitality and its ability to maintain a
constructive relationship with the discipline as it evolves.
Epistemology: The most radical epistemological challenge that liberalism has to
face, nevertheless, is of a more profound nature and can be summed up in the fol-
lowing question: Can liberalism continue to provide key aspects in understanding an
‘ever less modern’ international politics, it being a tradition imbued with Enlight-
enment and modernity? Modernity is, above all, trust in progress, in the possibility of
control (in addition, social control through institutions such as the state); it is trust in
instrumental rationality, in science, and technology. The modern man is the citizen-
individual, whomay be controlled by an oppressive and totalitarian system (such as in
the case of Bentham’s Panopticon or George Orwell’s 1984), but who can also aspire
to his own emancipation. Many elements continue to remain of this modernity;
however, many others are experiencing a crisis, upto an extent that some authors
speak of ‘postmodernity’ (Jean-François Lyotard) and others of a signiﬁcant trans-
formation of modernity (Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens). As far as
liberalism is concerned, what is under pressure is the trust, intrinsically of the
Enlightenment and modern mold, in the possibility of progress governed by man and
the trust in the capacity of analysis and rational collective response to the challenges.
Beyond Western IR: Moreover, in the world of late modernity, the non-Western
component is emerging in its complexity. We might wonder what a highly oriented
Western (centric) discipline such as IR has to offer to this world in heuristic and
normative terms. A growing literature is addressing this issue (Tickner and Wæver,
2009); however, there still remains a signiﬁcant amount of work to be done to make
the discipline truly more global. Liberalism is no exception to this.
Testing constructivism in the context of contemporary IR
Author: Daniela Sicurelli
Established during the 1980s, constructivism is the youngest approach that can be
included in the mainstream of IR theories. Its main contribution is the assumption of
86 SON IA LUCARELL I ET AL .
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2015.4
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 03 Feb 2017 at 12:17:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
the constitutive role of ideational factors in IR. From this perspective, material
factors cannot be categorized per se, and inter-subjective understandings contribute
to their interpretation and classiﬁcation.
After the Cold War, anarchy, theorized by neo-realists as the structure of IR, still
appeared relevant to the understanding of the former rivalry between the United
States and the Soviet Union; however, it emerged as a social construction rather
than as a given. This innovative perspective enabled constructivist scholars to
provide a new reading of the Soviet Union’s dissolution as the result of identity
redeﬁnition. The implications of these claims also appeared evident in studies on the
post-Cold War era. Constructivist contributions to security studies in the 1990s
demonstrated that military intervention cannot be understood without paying
attention to ideational factors. Moreover, dissolution of the Soviet Union
strengthened the capacity of international organizations, social movements, and
epistemic communities to foster norm diffusion at the global level.
Today, this approach has found wide support both in Europe and in the United
States and is increasingly attracting the attention of scholars in non-Western
academia as well. This approach has also inﬂuenced the development of a broadly
positivist branch of Political Science, namely comparative politics. Even without
referring explicitly to it, scholars of political institutions and the government have
increasingly focused on the role of ideas and collective understandings (Peters,
2011).
Yet, constructivism is constantly subject to criticism from both the positivist and
post-positivist sides of the political theory debate. Moreover, recent changes in the
international system, including the weakening of international organizations, the
emerging role of non-liberal ideas, and the shift of the global center of power
beyond the Western hemisphere, have raised new problems for scholars belonging
to this school of thought.
Constructivist insights on contemporary world politics
Major constructivist contributions to the study of current global politics include the
analysis of socialization dynamics, the concept of the security community, and the
role of identity factors as triggers of change in the global distribution of power.
Studies on socialization processes have shed light on the deep impact of interna-
tional institutions, deﬁned as formal and informal sets of rules, in the shaping of
states’ interests and identities. For instance, they have contributed to understanding
of the emergence and consolidation of neoliberal ideas within international orga-
nizations and accounted for mechanisms that make those ideas resilient over time.
Moreover, a signiﬁcant contribution by constructivism can be found in the ﬁeld
of security studies, as remarked by Lucarelli and Monteleone in this issue. The
assumption that security threats are constructed has enabled constructivists to trace
the processes of securitization of foreign policy issues that have taken place since the
1990s in multiple ﬁelds, such as development cooperation, migrations, climate
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change, and energy (Guzzini, 2011). Studies on security communities have provided
insights for the interpretation of emerging regional security organizations in Africa,
Asia, and South America. The reading of changes in the material distribution of
power as a constructed concept has also laid the foundations for understanding the
ideational factors shaping the global role currently played by emerging powers.
From this perspective, these changes matter insofar as great powers either advocate
or oppose the development of new international norms (Drezner, 2007; Zürn and
Stephen, 2010).
On these bases, constructivism has had a signiﬁcant impact on the current theore-
tical and methodological debate about international politics. Major achievements by
this approach include bringing ideational variables back to the attention of all main-
stream theories of IR and contributing to progress in discourse analysis research.
Theoretical and empirical challenges
Middle-ground position and internal fragmentation: The position of constructivism
in the middle ground between rationalism and postmodernism raises questions
concerning its boundaries, triggers criticisms by both camps, and has also created
the conditions for broad internal diversiﬁcation and fragmentation.
Positivists point to the weak explanatory and predictive potential of
constructivist assumptions. They claim that because constructivists assume that the
social structure constitutes the nation states and the international system, they are
vague about what contributes toward building these structures, where state
identities come from, and how they are expected to evolve (Kaufman, 2013).
Post-positivist scholars, in turn, criticize the very explanatory ambition of these
scholars. From this point of view, Zehfuss (2001: 338) highlights the dangerous
liaison between constructivism and identity, stressing the limits of identity-based
explanations of IR proposed by constructivists.
A multitude of constructivisms have originated from attempts to contribute to this
debate. However, over the past decade, rather than engaging in meta-theoretical
debates and addressing criticisms of internal fragmentation, constructivist scholars
have mainly focused on empirical research (Adler, 2012). One might even argue that
these recent studies have further increased the internal differentiation of this approach
to IR. Indeed, hybrid approaches merging constructivist assumptions with rationalist,
postmodernist, and critical theory insights have proliferated in the past decade.
Pragmatist scholars have welcomed the merging of constructivism with other schools
(Friedrick and Kratochwil, 2009), whereas others have concluded that attempts at
building bridges between opposing theoretical schools end up watering down the
original contribution of the constructivist agenda (Wiener, 2003).
Regression of established norms and diffusion of non-liberal ideas: Recent
developments in contemporary world politics seem to reinforce criticisms of the
explanatory and predictive potential of constructivist research and challenge its
optimistic view in regard to international cooperation.
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Constructivists share with liberal theorists the assumption that ‘international
institutions can transform state identities and interests’ (Wendt, 1992: 394), a value
commitment toward international cooperation, and an optimistic attitude toward
change (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008). More speciﬁcally, studies on norm diffusion
assume that this process occurs through gradual steps from norm emergence to
norm spread and interiorization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; K. Stiles, 2008). In
this regard, recent cases of the degeneration of established liberal norms and the
diffusion of non-liberal ideas represent challenges for constructivist studies of norm
diffusion.
An example of norm regression is the weak deﬁnition of torture provided by the
United States after 11 September 2001, concerning the interrogation methods used
against alleged al-Qaeda members. This deﬁnition appears to contrast with the UN
Convention on Torture and with established domestic norms concerning the ban on
torture. Similarly, the proliferation of agreements between EUmember states on the
forced repatriation of migrants, despite the principle of non-refoulement established
by the UNHCR, which has become a consuetudinary norm within international
law, raises questions about factors explaining norm erosion. On the bases of these
cases, questions remain open for further research: Why do embedded norms
sometimes lose their prescriptive potential and disappear? What factors are needed
to erode dominant global norms and create the conditions for acceptance of alter-
native ones (McKeown, 2009; Panke and Petersohn, 2012)? Can constructivism
address these questions without giving explanatory potential to the interests of
powerful actors and greater attention to domestic politics?
Moreover, constructivism generally suffers from a ‘nice norm’ bias (McKeown,
2009). Constructivist studies on the inﬂuence of epistemic communities, social
movements, and international organizations on world politics have proliferated
(Snow, 2004; Goodman and Jinks, 2013), but there is a gap in this literature con-
cerning issues, such as the spread of political Islam or the use of violence by ideo-
logically motivated actors in IR (Adamson, 2005). These actors challenge the
optimistic orientation of many constructivists toward norm diffusion as a driver of
international cooperation.
Questions also arise with respect to the ability of constructivist studies to predict
change. There is a gap in the constructivist literature concerning the conditions
necessary to reach the ultimate stage of the socialization process, which is that of
norm internalization. An emblematic case in this regard is the approach of the
Chinese government to human rights. The government has recently ratiﬁed core
international treaties and engaged in gradual ‘discursive enmeshment’ in the global
human rights regime (Foot, 2000). Nevertheless, one might wonder whether these
developments represent one of the early stages of the country’s socialization into
international human rights law or merely a cosmetic change made by the central
government in order to improve its international image while domestically preser-
ving the status quo. Most constructivist empirical research seems to avoid this
question and focuses on international norm creation rather than implementation.
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Finally, till date, constructivism has overestimated the role of international norms
and downplayed the agency of local actors (Acharya, 2011). The emergence of non-
Western powers sharing a common developmental discourse and political culture in
opposition to the discourse dominating international organizations, and the role of
regional leaders in shaping security communities in Asia and Africa provide new
challenges to the interpretative schemes used by constructivists (Haacke, 2013;
Dembinski and Schott, 2014).
These emerging trends and power dynamics call into question some of the
generalizations provided by constructivist research. At the same time, they conﬁrm
the importance of ideas and norms in IR, thereby furnishing opportunities to further
test and develop the constructivist research agenda.
Security studies and the challenge of adaptation
Author: Carla Monteleone
Security studies emerged as a distinct ﬁeld in the mid-to-late 1940s and soon
adopted a military focus to address policy problems arising from nuclear weapons
and the Soviet threat (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Deterrence, the security dilemma,
and theories of balancing became essential to the understanding andmanagement of
bipolar dynamics. In reaction to speciﬁc events over time, the ﬁeld widened its
scope. The 1973 Middle East crisis put economic security and terrorism onto the
agenda. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident led to greater attention being paid to
environmental issues. Overpopulation, underdevelopment, and political violence
came to the fore following the political revolutions and migratory ﬂows of the late
1980s and early 1990s.
Since the end of the Cold War, the ﬁeld has encompassed new dimensions and
diversiﬁed its ontological and methodological approaches toward the study of
security. This has allowed a better grasp of long neglected objects, actors, and
practices. The attention paid to securitization processes, in particular, allowed
understanding of how security threats are constructed, the inter-subjective
dimension of security, inclusion and exclusion processes, and how security threats
could be deconstructed (Balzaq, 2011). The new focus on the until then under-
developed concept of security revealed how much the Cold War had inﬂuenced the
identiﬁcation of security with the military sector and how important cultural and
normative factors were as drivers of change, next to material factors.
The end of the Cold War also brought renewed attention toward world-system
security and long-term changes in the security ﬁeld. Scholars analyzed world-level
institutional changes, and, in particular, the evolution toward systems of cooperative
security. Among security regimes, the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime was carefully scrutinized (the journal The Nonproliferation Review hosted
many empirical analyses on this issue; among others, see the two special issues on
nuclear non-proliferation policy in the Journal of Conﬂict Resolution in 2009
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and 2014). Analyses also focused on the decline of state death since the end of World
War II and the evolution of security from a private to a public good. Signiﬁcant
attention was paid to the creation and evolution of global public policies and their
policy cycle in the security sector. This was particularly evident in the empirical ana-
lyses of peace operations (the journal International Peacekeeping reﬂected the greater
attention toward this issue; among others, see also Fazal, 2007; Attinà, 2011;
Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012).
Nevertheless, changes particularly evident after the end of the Cold War have
challenged security studies, exposing its reactive and conservative attitude.
Challenges to security studies
Contemporary armed conﬂicts: Changes in the nature, characteristics, and goals of
contemporary armed conﬂicts are among the biggest challenges to security studies.
State-centric and employing military power as the most important independent vari-
able, traditionalist approaches have focused on interstate wars and dynamics between
states (mostly in terms of balance of power and deterrence). Interstate wars, however,
have become rare, whereas intra-state wars have increased in number and relevance,
and have strongly been associated with state failure or weakness. Contemporary
armed conﬂicts reveal how irrelevant deterrence can be when conﬂicts are fought to
obtain non-territorial gains, by actors (both rebels and governmental forces) adopting
criminal methods to ﬁnance their war activities. This deeply affects the duration and
intensity of war and underlines the importance of intervening not just militarily – as
traditionalists would suggest – nor with development instruments that risk injecting
new resources into the cycle of war ﬁnancing, as proposed by scholars closer to human
security, peace studies, or post-Marxist approaches.
Security studies scholars have had difﬁculty agreeing on the factors explaining
change in one of their core research interests and suggesting effective solutions. The
described changes have highlighted that institutional, technological, and normative
modiﬁcations deserving further exploration have altered the perceived costs and
beneﬁts of armed conﬂicts. They also reveal that it is no longer useful to look at
states as monolithic entities: looking inside states may be more important.
Democratization: The relationship between democratization and security has
been only partially explored. Democratic peace theory has highlighted some reg-
ularity in the way democracies manage their conﬂicts in dyadic relations, and has
inﬂuenced the adoption of democracy promotion as a security policy. Nevertheless,
certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of military dis-
putes (Mansﬁeld and Snyder, 2005). The democratization processes beginning from
the so-called third wave have introduced a high number of new democracies and
hybrid regimes whose behavior and performance affect regional stability. However,
while democracy promotion has increasingly been used as a security policy, the
implications of democratization processes and democratic state building have not
been fully explored by security studies (among the exceptions, Miller, 2012).
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Democratization can be a challenge for security studies also in another respect. The
growth of multilateralism since the second half of the 19th century reﬂects the diffu-
sion of democratic practices (Attinà, 2011). As the number of democratic countries has
reached a critical mass, a normative change has taken place, leading to expectations of
an organizational change of existing security institutions. Expectations are that the
decision-making process of an institution like the Security Council should be demo-
cratic, and issues are framed as if it were democratic already. However, opportunities
to inﬂuence this decision-making process are still limited. This is problematic because
multilateral security and peace operations in particular have become more and more
intrusive. The adoption of the so-called third-generation peace operations and of the
concept of responsibility to protect has signaled a willingness to go beyond national
sovereignty. However, scanty results (Libya) and inconsistent application (Syria) are
challenging existing forms of multilateralism, now under the control neither of the
only remaining superpower nor a fully democratic body. This means that more
attention should be devoted to how decisions on security issues are made within
security institutions and, more importantly, by whom. It also means that, if unsolved,
the contradiction between input and output legitimacy in multilateral security risks
bringing military alliances and pacts to new life.
Risk management: Risk management is increasingly important in contemporary
security policies and agendas. Although this trend challenges traditionalist
approaches and conﬁrms the relevance of constructivist and critical approaches, in
that they promote an enquiry into how security threats emerge, it ultimately chal-
lenges them too. The discovery of risk as a source of insecurity represents a move
away from an existential threat and a state of exception, traditionally managed by
states, toward a ‘routinization’ of the exception that transforms a public good into a
private one, which can be produced by private companies as long as they possess the
right technical solutions. It is also a shift from an objectively existing immediate
known threat, ﬁnite, and intentional, to a subjectively existing long-term unknown
one, inﬁnite, and unintentional, whose consequences, although serious, need not be
existential (Kessler, 2010).
Faced with less and less-controllable global risks, states adopt a preventive and
proactive stance. The role of those who contribute to deﬁning risk and how to
manage it (the risk communities) becomes particularly important, because they
deﬁne who and what deserves to be included and protected by the political com-
munity or not, as well as what goals the political community should achieve.
Current efforts at analyzing the (in)securitization process have provided valuable
methodological insights. However, so far, they have failed to identify in a systematic
way: securitizing actors and practices, the conditions allowing the same securitizing
actor to be successful or not under different circumstances, whether the actors and
practices identiﬁed by the different schools are compatible or not, and what
instruments can be used for security purposes.
Theoretical challenges: The many approaches that have sprung up over time have
revealed a ﬁeld capable of moving beyond its limits to inquire into new phenomena,
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and of borrowing from other ﬁelds to increase its heuristic capacities. Nevertheless,
the many approaches have had a hard time creating a fruitful dialogue with one
another. Moreover, the emergence of non-Western powers and security cultures
and the concentration of conﬂicts and security-relevant phenomena in non-Western
areas highlight new limits to existing approaches. So far, security studies has very
much been a Western discipline, focused mostly on the European and American
experience. This makes its results applicable to speciﬁc contexts only, or in need of
testing in other contexts.
Adapting to ongoing changes rather than just reacting to speciﬁc events may
require a redeﬁnition of its focus, attitude, and identity and a greater willingness to
engage in a real dialogue among its schools. It is also a crucial effort for the rele-
vance of security studies in the 21st century.
Understanding global economic crises: International Political Economy approaches
under exceptional circumstances
Author: Eugenia Baroncelli
Over the past two centuries, the occurrence of global crises in the world economy
has offered countless occasions for social scientists to focus on the interplay between
politics and economics. Major milestones in the discipline have been published
during – or in the aftermath of – global crises, witness Keynes’ Theory and Polanyi’s
Great Transformation. It did not come as a surprise that International Political
Economy (IPE) as a subject matter originated in the midst of a major systemic crisis
(Strange, 1970; Cohen, 2008). Thanks to the entrepreneurship of a few (among
whom were Susan Strange, Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye), a debate was
launched in the relatively closed milieu of IR transatlantic environment in the late
1960s, on the need to develop inter-disciplinary lenses to account for major political
and economic disorders that would periodically hit the international system.
Compared with other IR approaches, IPE appears better suited to study systemic
crises that involve interactions between economic and political elements. An
essentially inter-disciplinary vocation allows IPE scholars to examine complex
sequences of events under multiple angles, simultaneously. Proﬁt-maximizing and
welfare-seeking logics may inform actors’ choices as much as security-enhancing
and value-oriented behaviors do. The issue, of direct interest to IPE research, is
under which conditions, how and to what effect does this occur.
Varieties of rationalism and systemic crises: highlights and lowlights
Insights from both comparative politics and political economy of endogenous
decisions have shed light on the role played by speciﬁc domestic political processes
in exacerbating global crises such as in the case of widespread protectionism in the
1930s (Gourevitch, 1986), or in inﬂuencing the ‘global’ regulation of international
ﬁnancial markets, through the interactions among national systems of regulation
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(Farrell and Newman, 2010). Market dynamics are thus connected with policy
decisions at different governance levels. Studying crises through a prism combining
multiple lenses, however, increases complexity to levels that are difﬁcult to manage
analytically, with the result that ‘white noise’ impairs both methodological and
empirical clarity. Then, again, an exclusive emphasis on inside–out causation and
the narrow focus of some quantitative analyses, have at times spelled an extremely
high level of sectoralization, particularly in American IPE, biasing focus away from
the theorization of broad changes in the global political economy (Wade,
2009: 117).
A further risk, inherent in treating systemic crises as springboards for ‘foundational’
re-deﬁnitions of the discipline, is the prominence of ‘here and now’ arguments in many
studies of critical international turns. ‘This time is different’ has not been an uncom-
mon interpretation of the complexity of systemic crises. Both political and economic
analyses have provided a guard against the perils of ‘exceptionalizing’ exceptionality,
as proven by Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), in the vein of seminal research in the
institutionalist tradition (North and Weingast, 1989). Although relevant for its focus
on the role of institutional reforms in facilitating political responses to global crises,
Rogoff and Reinhart’s subsequent elaboration has been signiﬁcantly debated, owing
to the disputable accuracy of some key ﬁndings, and regressive policy implications
(Herndon et al., 2014).
The constructivist counterpoint: new and old ideas
Furthermore, institutional innovation, and institutional change at large, has at times
depended on extra-institutional factors. As substantiated by constructivist IPE, its
dynamics do not systematically follow a logic of consequentiality (Blyth, 2002).
Provocatively asserting that ‘economics are too important to leave it to economists’
(Widmaier, 2009), constructivist IPE has somewhat tended to downplay
previous economic analyses on the role of non-material factors in systemic crises
(Kindleberger, 1978; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009).
Yet, IPE constructivists have innovatively studied the sociological dynamics
through which ideas originate and diffuse across governance levels, contributing to
systemic shocks, as argued by Hobson and Seabrooke (2007) about the outburst of
the subprime bubble. Partially contradicting the rationalist camp, sociologically
oriented IPE has investigated how bottom-up dynamics inﬂuence mid-level
outcomes, including US consumerism, through the role of unprivileged consensus-
seeking groups (Jacobs, 2005). These studies further prove the importance of
two-way frameworks (top-down and bottom-up) in the understanding of systemic
(exceptional) change. Reﬂectivist analyses have signiﬁcantly contributed to the IPE
literature on the crisis, exploring the often-unacknowledged ‘everyday and
emotional’ inﬂuences (Widmaier, 2009) that shape state interests and market
trends, to highlight a key process through which material and ideational factors
interact via non-rational logics.
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IPE and systemic crises: learning from the past and challenges ahead
Apart from their signiﬁcant merits, rationalist and constructivist IPE studies have
displayed unambiguous limitations in the analysis of global changes. Rationalist
(American) IPE – in its strongest and predictive vein – failed to anticipate the crisis of
2008 (Cohen, 2009; Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011). In fact, on the eastern shore of
the Atlantic, British IPE had questioned the premises on which risk creation and
propagation were conceptualized in contemporary ﬁnancial models, policies, and
practices (Langley, 2002; Watson, 2007). Yet, such warnings fell on deaf ears,
before the subprime mortgage bubble burst. A major change has occurred since
then, and critical voices have even cautioned against the collapse of a still poorly
reformed – status quo – system (Helleiner, 2014). Although the question whether
social sciences should be in the business of prediction at all may not be a misplaced
one (Mosley and Singer, 2009), there is little doubt that IPE scholarship has learnt
its lesson the hard way.
Relative to other areas in the social sciences, the inter-disciplinary nature of IPE
offers several beneﬁts. Relaxing some of the assumptions of Open Economy Politics
paradigm and expanding its tools to model outside–in dynamics seems a promising
way to make sense of crises without losing analytical rigor and lowering explana-
tory ambitions too much (Lake, 2009; Oatley, 2011). Openness to accepting that
both rationally altruistic and non-rational dynamics may be at play has become a
necessity, even in the rationalist camp (Keohane, 2009: 38; Leblang and Pandya,
2009). Unlike IR, IPE has an ontological vocation to look beyond high (security)
politics. Unlike economics, it carries a foundational interest in the analysis of the
political origins of economic decisions, and an equally constitutive drive to look at
the political consequences of economic shocks. Such disposition appears crucial to
derive meaningful insights into the dynamics of global ﬁnancial regulation, capital
rules, and macroeconomic policy making that are on top of leaders’ and citizens’
priorities these days.
On the empirical front, looking at past interactions in monetary and ﬁnancial
relations has been one natural path to beat. A major topic of interest has been the
(likely) requirements for international cooperation to be effective in solving the
problems of the current system. The analytical challenge would be – no less – an
effort in singling out the speciﬁcities of cooperation before crisis, from those relative
to cooperation during and after a crisis. Studies in the political economy of mone-
tary relations that have explored the long-run record of international cooperation
under critical turns have found that, compared with the past, a few elements in the
current system concur in indicating a positive prognosis (Eichengreen, 2011).
Differently from the inter-war period, countries are not divided along rooted ideo-
logical divides. The increased technicality of ﬁnancial matters may diminish the
politicization of negotiations. Moreover, the greater institutionalization of mone-
tary and ﬁnancial cooperation at the international level, through the reform of the
IMF governance and the Basel III agreement on banking supervision, reduces
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uncertainty and ensures the reiteration of negotiations, which in turn increases the
likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, however, a higher number of
systemically important actors have heightened transaction costs associated with
cooperation. The absence of a Bretton Woods-like institutional compact to
coordinate global liquidity and exchange rate ﬂuctuations has encouraged
instability and propelled uncertainty. In addition, the fragmentation of epistemic
communities, each lobbying for its own technical agenda, has more than compen-
sated the lower politicization of the current system. Finally, the general comity
among G-20 members cannot be equated to the security ties that existed in the
transatlantic compact during the Bretton Woods era.
More particularly, and relative to the evolution of the sovereign debt crises in
Europe, liberal institutionalists have exposed the failure of the EU institutional
anchoring in preventing the deterioration of the Greek and Spanish economies,
questioning whether – and how – the euro area will be able to effectively lead the
adjustment of its members out of the crisis (Carlin, 2011). According to some, the
solutions will depend, inter alia, on which narratives of the Eurocrisis prevail in policy
circles. Yet, the intra-European divide between Ordoliberals and neo-Keynesians
interacts with the cleavage between leaderships in mature systems, on the one hand,
and elites in emerging market countries, on the other, over the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policies. An ineludible step of IPE analyses of the crisis is thus to factor
in the relations among the United States, China, and other key emerging market
economies, to explore how European dynamics are being played out in global
processes and fora. Diverging geo-political priorities and an intellectual disagreement
on how to restore growth make the task of cooperating even more daunting. IPE
approaches in both the reﬂectivist and rationalist traditions should become engaged in
deriving testable implications on the consequences of normative dissent and hetero-
geneous interests across different governance levels in uncertain times.
Although accounting for mixes of rational and non-rational logics makes it even
more complicated to investigate the type and likelihood of the upcoming evolutions
in the global ﬁnancial system, this is not a reason that is valid enough for interna-
tional studies to do away with such complexity. Born in dire times and grown up in
the midst of a systemic crisis, IPE research has been strengthened by criticisms from
economists and political scientists alike. There is evidence to argue that such
training has started to bear some fruits.
Concluding remarks: a transformed IR for a changed international system
The evaluation of the heuristic value of IR schools of thought with respect to the
current world politics has pointed to a set of challenges that are common to all IR
approaches as well as others that concern only speciﬁc Schools.
The most important challenges to IR’s heuristic value are the transformation of
the main actors of world politics and its de-Westernization. If some schools are
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equipped to provide useful cognitive tools for an ever less state-centric world, no IR
approach has yet been able to overcome theWestern-centric nature of the discipline.
Another common challenge is concerning the gradual postmodernization of
world politics, both in the sense of the transformation of the Westphalian modern
state system (and the emergence of non-state actors) and in the more profound sense
of the (partial) overcoming of the ﬁrst modernity with its trust in rationality, pro-
gress, and modern institutions. IR (although with exceptions) is still predominantly
embedded in a modern mindset.
As for the challenges to speciﬁc IR Schools of thought, Moro’s recollection of
realism points to the persistence of the paradigm despite the ‘pluralization’ of world
politics. However, he claims, the academic and policy relevance of realism will
largely depend on realist scholars’ ability to integrate in a coherent framework
insights on agency that have emerged from institutional analyses in the past
decades. At the same time, realist scholars will have to redeﬁne research questions
that can be effectively addressed coherently with the need to provide testable
theories.
Lucarelli underlines how liberalism captures better than other approaches the
main features of the current international system (particularly its pluralism), but at
the same time it is challenged by the transformation of core elements of interna-
tional politics (e.g. democracy, multilateralism, the role of non-Western actors), by
the methodological challenge of constructivism and by the ‘postmodernization’ of
international politics. Inherently modern and faithful in progress and rationality,
liberalism risks being ill-suited to cope with an ever more postmodern world.
Sicurelli’s reading of constructivism stresses the capacity of the approach to
explain current events in international relations such as the spread of international
norms beyond the West. Nevertheless, it points to its difﬁculties in responding to
criticisms made by the opposite theoretical fronts of rationalism and postmodern-
ism and to the empirical challenges raised by contemporary phenomena such as the
weakening of established norms and the diffusion of non-liberal ideas.
Evaluating security studies after the Cold War, Monteleone ﬁnds that, despite
several transformations in security studies (e.g. the Copenhagen turning point, the
return to world-system level analyses, and analyses of global public policies), the
ﬁeld is challenged by the changing nature of armed conﬂicts, democratization pro-
cesses, the shift from threat to risk, the rise of non-Western powers and security
cultures, and the limited dialogue among the existing approaches. This may require
a painful redeﬁnition of its focus, identity, and, most of all, attitude.
Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of international political economy on the
basis of its ability to understand the economic crisis of 2008, Eugenia Baroncelli
reaches the conclusion that in spite of its weaknesses and some faux pas, IPE
scholars have learnt their post-crisis lesson. True to its inclusive and inter-
disciplinary origins, since 2008, IPE has attributed a heightened relevance to the
study of systemic changes under exceptional circumstances. Approaches in both
rationalist and reﬂectivist IPE paradigms have developed analytical tools that can be
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valuably employed to reﬁne our understanding of the dynamics of diffusion, com-
petition, and cooperation in global ﬁnancial regulation. Recent studies have indeed
contributed to orient scholars and policy makers in the politics and practice of
global cooperation in macroeconomic policy making.
On the whole, the picture that emerges is one of a discipline that faces
indisputable challenges, emerging mainly from the transformation of its subject of
study – international politics – and from its own ontological limits as a discipline
developed during the ColdWar and deeply grounded in the West. At the same time,
however, the analyses here undertaken conﬁrm that in today’s world politics there is
a desperate need for more and better theorization in IR, rather than for a passive
acceptance of the discipline’s weaknesses. IR might develop beyond paradigms and
schools or with intertwined ones, but the theoretical toolkits provided by the
discipline are still necessary and urgently needed to make a challenging world more
intelligible.
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